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Laws III: Constitutional Law - Montana's Discriminatory Licensing Structure
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Montana's Discriminatory Licensing Structure for
Nonresidents: Commerce Clause Analysis. Baldwin v. Fish and Game
Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).

In 1976 the State of Montana implemented a new rate
structure for the distribution of hunting licenses. It was
ostensibly a measure of conservation in response to the increased popularity in big game hunting. Under the amended
statute a Montana resident could purchase a license solely
for elk for $9. The nonresident, in order to hunt elk, was required to purchase a combination license at a cost of $225.'
This combination license entitled the taking of one elk, one
deer, one black bear, game birds and fish. A resident was not
required to purchase the combination license. Therefore, if
the nonresident wished to hunt only elk, he paid 25 times as
much as the resident. If the nonresident wished to hunt all
the wildlife under the multiple license, he paid 7-1/2 times as
much as the resident. Montana also imposed a statutory ceiling limiting the number of nonresident licenses to 17,000 in
any one year.2
Disturbed by the substantial fee differential between
residents and nonresidents, appellant Baldwin and others
brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief for reimbursement of hunting fees already paid. The complaint
challenged the rate structure as being violative of the
privileges and immunities clause of Article IV Section 2 and
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.
The Supreme Court in a 6 to 3 decision affirmed the
three judge District Court's split decision which held that
recreational hunting was not a fundamental right and
therefore was not within the purview of the privileges and
immunities clause. The court held further that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was not
violated. They perceived a rational basis for the discrimination against nonresidents.' In effect, the Baldwin decision
has severely limited the constitutional protection afforded
nonresidents. By defining privileges and immunities protection on the basis of fundamental rights, the court was able to
Copyright'E 1979 by the University of Wyoming.
1.
2.

MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 26-202.1(4) and (12) (Supp. 1977).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 4 26-202.1(16)(f) (Supt). 1977).

3.

Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978). [Hereinafter cited as: Baldwin.]
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circumvent the strict scrutiny test required by Toomer v.
Wits eli. 4 Moreover, under traditional equal protection
analysis, legitimate state interests invariably survive even if
discriminatorily applied because, "rationality is sufficient." 5
The narrow effect of Baldwin is that State recreational
fee differentials for nonresidents are not constitutionally
repugnant under either the privileges and immunities clause
or the equal protection clause. The decision, however, does
not preclude other relevant constitutional inquiries such as
the validity of such rate structures under the commerce
clause.
Historically the equal protection clause, the privileges
and immunities clause and the commerce clause all have a
"common origin in the Articles of the Confederation and
their shared vision of federalism." ' 6 The recent case of
Hicklin v. Orbeck recognized this relationship.7 Moreover,
the concerns of the equal protection clause, the privileges
and immunities clause and the commerce clause are
remarkably similar in that they all address the problems
that occur when state governments inflict injury on
geographical and political outsiders."
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

It is well settled that even in the absence of a Congressional exercise of power, the negative implications of the
Commerce Clause prevent the states from erecting barriers
to the free flow of interstate trade. 9 Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Baldwin recognized that a state's right under
its police power to pass laws regulating game is not absolute
4.

Toomer v. WitseU, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); (commercial fishing). Toomer involved a
South Carolina law that limited commercial access to migratory shrimp within a
three mile belt off the state's coast by imposing an enormous fee differential (100 to
1) on nonresidents. The court struck down the state statute by devising a substantial reason test for the privileges and immunities clause. This substantial reason test
required:
1. a determination of whether the nonresident constituted a peculiar source of the
evil at which the statute was designed to remedy. Id. at 398.
2. a sufficiently demonstrated connection between the ends sought and the discrimination practiced. Id. at 396.
3. an inquiry into the impracticability of apparent and less intrusive alternatives.
Id. at 398.
5. Baldwin, supra note 3, at 391.
6. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 98 S. Ct. 2482, 2491 (1978).
7. Id.
8. TmBE; AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-33 (1978).
9. A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370 (1976).
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in the face of prevailing federal interests.' 0 Arguably, under
a factual situation similar to Baldwin a strong federal interest is the protection of interstate commerce. To date,
there has been no Supreme Court decision fully defining the
scope of federal wildlife regulatory power conferred by the
commerce clause. 1 However, the exertion of federal power
need not await the disruption of commerce. 2
The commerce clause is one of the most prolific sources
of national power and an equally prolific source of conflict
with state legislation.' 3 With the aid of judicial construction,
the commerce clause has greatly expanded over the years to
reflect changing perceptions of the scope of its powers.1 4 The
judicial inquiry under the commerce clause focuses on one of
three main categories:
1. The use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce
which Congress believes are being misused.
2. The protection of the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.
3. Those activities affecting commerce.' 5
The Baldwin court focused on an extremely restricted
interpretation of the commerce clause when it acknowledged
that, "[o]nce wildlife becomes involved in interstate commerce, a state may not restrict the use or access to that
wildlife in a way that burdens interstate commerce.

To be

sure once the game is reduced to possession, the possession
creates an absolute property in the possessor thereby entitling him to the full rights of ownership and protection under
the commerce clause.' 7 In Foster Fountain Packing v.
Haydel the court held that after game was reduced to possession (in this case, shrimp), the states overriding special interest in the regulation of game ceased to be paramount to
the commerce rights thereby vested in hunter." Fosterwas
10.

Baldwin, supra note 3, at 1865; (concurring opinion).

11.

COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

32 (1977).
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.S. 197, 222 (1938).
Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 534 (1949).
15A AM.JUR.2D Commerce § 1 (1976).
Id. at 319.
Baldwin, supra note 3, at 393; (concurring opinion).
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
Id. at 13.
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the first significant erosion of the state-ownership theory.
The state-ownership theory, first articulated in Geer v. Connecticut, allowed any and all forms of state regulation both
before and after reducing the game to possession and also to
the point of excluding nonresidents altogether. 9 But this
concept of objects "involved or moving" in commerce fails to
consider the modern analysis of the commerce clause that activities or regulations need only affect interstate
commerce." When using contemporary analysis, one need
not be concerned about game "moving" in interstate commerce.
Under the modern commerce clause, no state would
seriously contend that the clause is impotent in the face of
wholly intrastate activities that incidentally affect interstate commerce. To be sure this was the dispositive factor
of earlier fish and game cases such as Silz v. Hesterberg
where the court held that interference with commerce was
ony incidental and not the direct purpose of the regulation.
The essential inquiry under the modern analysis is whether
such regulations and activities are commerce or affect commerce even though local in nature and purpose. There is
overwhelming authority to support this contention. One of
the greatest expansions of commerce power over intrastate
activities was upheld in Wickard v. Filburn." In Wickard the
court held that even violations trivial in themselves were insufficient cause from removing it from the scope of the commerce clause. Taken together with others similarly situated
the result was far from trivial. 4
By only considering a state's special interest in the
regulation of game, a court fails to recognize the actual
burden placed on constitutionally protected activities. This
burden occurs long before the wildlife is reduced to possession.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S.; 379 U.S. 241, 258 J1964).
Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 (1908). In Silz the court said that state regulation of
game is unlawful if it interfered directly with commerce. The court determined that
the police regulation need only be reasonable.
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (19351; Hughes v. Alexandria Scap.
Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Id. at 128. The court held that the power to regulate wheat included the power to
regulate practices affecting wheat prices.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss1/13

4

Laws III: Constitutional Law - Montana's Discriminatory Licensing Structure

1979

CASE NOTES

307

HUNTING SERVICES ARE COMMERCE

Admittedly, big game hunting is a recreation and a
sport.25 It is also big business in most western states.2" In
1975 sportsmen in Wyoming alone contributed over 80
million dollars to the state economy.27 Sportsmen have also
made similar contributions to the economies of Colorado,
Utah, Idaho, and Montana.28 It is apparent that the hunting
services industry is an integral component of state
economies in western states.
In 1975 nonresident hunters accounted for 75% of the
40 million dollars that big game hunting generated for
Wyoming's economy.9 In the same year nonresident hunters
spent over 6.5 million dollars solely on the outfitter and
guide services.3" And this figure does not even include the
multiplier effect that the hunting services generate for the
total economy. In one recent study the multiplier effect was
estimated at 2.6. 31 Multiplying this variable times the money
generated by the outfitters reveals that the cumulative contribution credited to the state economy is over 20 million
dollars. In Baldwin it was recognized that Montana is the
state most frequently visited by nonresident hunters.32
Therefore, the overall contribution to Montana's economy
generated by its outfitters should be significantly higher.
Thus one can argue that the hunting industry is commerce on the basis of the sheer dollar volume it contributes
to the state economy. As a result the outfitters and guides
should at least be entitled to judicial determination of
whether the state regulation impermissibly burdens interstate commerce. It is apparent the majority in Baldwin
failed to address this important question.
25. Id.
45

26.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NATURAL RESOURCES OF WYOMING

27.

WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING, HUNTING AND
FISHING EXPENDITURE VALUES AND PARTICIPATION PREFERENCE IN WYOMING IN

28.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

(1966).
1975 55 (1977).
OF THE INTERIOR, NATURAL RESOURCES OF COLORADO,

(1966). (Separate publications), in Colorado at 23 the 1960
figure was 90 million dollars.
29. WATER RESOURCES INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING, supra note 28 at 31.
30. Id.
31. Preliminary study conducted by the Agricultural Extension Service, University of
Wyoming, Garnet Premer. Distributive effect on Park County, Table 3 (Nov. 1977).
32. Baldwin, supra note 3, at 374, 375 n. 9.
UTAH, AND MONTANA
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In addition, case law would seem to support the proposition that the hunting services are commerce. However,
whether outfitters and professional guides are within the
ambit of commerce is a question of first impression. Because
some commerce activities (including hunting) escape federal
attention as a result of their local character, number and
diversity,"3 does not mean that state regulation of such activity will escape circumspection under the commerce
clause.3
The sport of baseball is the sole exception to an otherwise universal rule that all sports are within the province of
the commerce clause. 5 In Flood v. Kuhn the issue was
whether baseball's reserve system was within the reach of
the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court admitted that
baseball is commerce yet refused to invoke its protection.
The court of Flood said that baseball was an established
aberration that had survived the courts expanding concept
of interstate commerce only because of its established precedent.3 At first glance one could distinguish Flood on the
basis that in Flood the subject of commerce (the team) itself
moved across state lines whereas in Baldwin the activity
was local in nature. Other cases such as U. S. V International Boxing Club of N. Y. have held that entirely local
sporting affairs were subjects of interstate commerce.
Recreational activities and entertainment also have
generally been subject to the commerce clause. In Haviland
v. Butz the court said that traveling dog and pony shows
are subject to regulation by Congress in the exercise of the
commerce clause.3 ' As in InternationalBoxing, totally local
activities within a single state such as amusement parks
have also been subject to the commerce clause. 9 Again, one
might try to distinguish recreational hunting on the basis
that not only was it a purely local activity but it was also a
patron-participant sport rather than spectator oriented. In
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185
(1938).
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, supra note 12.
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
Id. at 282.
U.S. v. International Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236, 241 (1955).
Haviland v. Butz, 543 F.2d 169 (A.D.C. 1976).
Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, 394 F.2d 342, 352 (5th Cir. 1968).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol14/iss1/13

6

Laws III: Constitutional Law - Montana's Discriminatory Licensing Structure

1979

CASE NOTES

309

Miller v. Amusement Enterprises Inc. the court found no
distinction between the two.4"
To substantiate the claim that hunting services are interstate commerce we need not look past the facts presented
in Baldwin. For the license year of 1974-1975, Montana
licensed approximately 43,500 nonresidents to hunt elk and
deer.'
It was submitted that as many as half the
nonresidents who hunt elk utilized the outfitters service. 2
For a typical seven-day elk hunt a nonresident spends approximately $1250, exclusive of outfitters fee and hunting
licenses.43 Simple mathematics reveals that if half the
nonresidents (21,500) use the service spend over $1000 (rounding off) per person, revenue of more than 20 million dollars
is generated by the nonresident alone. And this is exclusive
of the $225 state license fee and the outfitter's fee.
Finally, the outfitter service is directed primarily
towards the nonresident; hence, across state lines. Incidental to this, hunting reservations for nonresidents are made
through use of interstate communications (mail or teleservices). This factor alone has been determinative in many
commerce cases.4 4 And of course the outfitters utilize sports
magazines, newspapers, and other interstate communications to advertise their business. Also, the outfitters may be
able to prove that much of their supplies (i.e. food, camping
equipment, guns) moved in interstate traffic. This also has
been critical in some commerce cases. 5 In the aggregate,
these factors clearly point to the conclusion that hunting services are substantially involved in interstate commerce.
DELICATE ADJUSTMENT TEST

The Baldwin court tested the constitutional validity of
the state regulation under the aegis of the equal protection
clause. Central to the equal protection analysis for nonfun40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 425.
Baldwin, supra note 3. at 374, 375 n. 9.
Id. at 374, 375.
Id. at 374, 375 n. 9.
Haviland v. Butz, supra note 39.
Rasmussen v. American Dairy Association, 472 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1973); In this case
the court held that the overall chain of events from the shipment of dried milk and
other ingredients into one state from other states constituted a single flow of commerce.
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damental rights is the proposition that the legislature has a
wide range of discretion in classifying persons for different
treatment.4 6 In other words, a state may constitutionally
discriminate against nonresidents simply because judicial
review of economic and social interests on equal protection
grounds is severely limited. Upon proving an assertion of a
rational basis between the legitimate state purposes and the
means utilized, the judicial inquiry ends because, "rationali48
ty is sufficient.
Stricter judicial scrutiny is necessarily a critical element
in every commerce clause analysis. The case of Raymond
Motor Transportationv. Rice is an example of this greater
scrutiny.4 9 In Raymond, the court roundly rejected the contention that the inquiry ends once a rational relation to a
legitimate state purpose is established.
Thus we cannot accept the State's contention that
the inquiry under the Commerce Clause is ended
without a weighing of the asserted safety purpose
against the50 degree of interference with interstate
commerce.
In the absence of Congressional guidance, when the exercise of local power simultaneously burdens interstate commerce the court is called upon to make "delicate adjustments" of the conflicting claims.' The relevant inquiries
in this delicate adjustment are:
1. Does the state have a legitimate interest in regulating thesubject matter?
2. Is the burden imposed on commerce clearly excessive in relation to the putative benefit?
3. Can the legitimate interest be promoted
with a
52
lesser impact on interstate activities?
Without question the states have a legitimate interest
in preserving wildlife and regulating their exploitation. 3 But
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

San Antonio independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 19 (1973).
Gray, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1127
(1968).
Baldwin, supra note 3, at 391.
Raymond Motor Transportation v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
ld. at 443.
A. & P. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, supra note 9, at 371.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Baldwin, supra note 3, at 390.
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this interest is neither absolute nor does it end the inquiry.
Legitimate state purposes are often frustrated by illegitimate means. 4 Nor does the mere assertion of legitimate
state interest end the matter because there exists an "infinite variety of cases where regulation of local matters may
operate as regulations of commerce." 5 In Hughes v. Alexandria Scap Corp. the court held that the mere assertion of
legitimate state interests was insufficient because the court
needed an adequate record containing the relevant factual
material which would afford a sure basis for an informed
judgment.5
In this delicate adjustment the court utilizes greater circumspection of the means employed to achieve the asserted
state interest. The court must weigh all the relevant factors
that bear on a particular case.5" Of course any evidence supporting the asserted state interest may be rebutted by contrary evidence. Many so-called legitimate state regulations
have fallen because contrary evidence proved the regulations
only marginally protected the legitimate interest while at
the same time burdened interstate commerce.58
The importance of the national interest in maintaining
free flowing interstate commerce cannot be underestimated
in the adjustment test. In the recent case of A & P Tea Co. v.
Cottrel the Supreme Court acknowledged that Mississippi
had a legitimate state interest in the sanitary regulation of
milk."' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed the
district court on the basis of impermissible interference with
the commerce clause.
The fallacy in the District Court's reasoning is that
it attached insignificance to the interference effected by the Clause upon the national interest in
freedom for the national commerce, and too great a
significance to the state interests purported to be
served by the clause.6
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, supra note 22.
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., supra note 22, at 830.
Id. at 830.
Raymond Motor Transportation, supra note 53, at 441.
A. & P. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, supra note 9.
Id. at 375.
Id.
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APPLICATION OF THE TEST

When there is conflict of state and federal interest the
judicial inquiry necessarily involves a sensitive considera61
tion and balancing of the state and national concerns.
Clearly the national interest is the protection of interstate
trade whereas the state interest in this matter is the conservation of wildlife.
During Montana's 1975 hunting season, 43,500 nonresident deer and elk licenses were sold.2 In 1976 Montana imposed the statutory ceiling on nonresident hunting
licenses. 6 Since the implementation of the multiple license,
the number of nonresident licenses sold has not reached the
statutory limit of 17,000.64 This alone has substantially impacted interstate commerce. It is possible the Baldwin decision will act to encourage future legislative proposals for the
substantial increase in nonresident fees for all state-provided
recreational activities. Under the pretext of conservation,
and using Baldwin as a shield, it would not be unreasonable
to speculate that states might shift the burden of their conservation programs on the nonresident through grossly
disproportionate license schemes.
As other states opt for their constitutional right under
Baldwin to price-gouge nonresidents or severely restrict
their access to game, the cumulative effect on interstate
commerce would rise proportionally. It is academic that once
a state drastically raises the price of nonresident fees, as
Montana has, the nonresident will either forgo hunting in
the state altogether or he will have to tighten his budget
while visiting the state. Not only do the guide services's lose
business but in addition all businesses reasonably related to
hunting including the entire tourist related industry. When
business in general suffers from over-regulation this factor is
also considered in the total effect on interstate commerce.6 5
Yet the court need not await total disruption 6of commerce
before acting to protect the national interest.1
61.
62,
63.
64.
65.
66.

Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, supra note 22 at 514.
Baldwin, supra note 3, at 374, 375 n. 9.
MONr. REV. CODES ANN. § 26-202.1(16)(f) (Supp. 1977).
Baldwin, supra note 3, at 375 n. 10.
Katzenbaugh v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, supra note 12.
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The states manifest interest is in wildlife preservation.
In Baldwin the court held the licensing scheme was a
legislative choice not unreasonably related to wildlife preservation. 7 However, the state program may fall under stricter
scrutiny.
First, for reasons stated above, a reasonable relation is
insufficient under the commerce clause. Secondly, it would
be difficult for the state to prove that the multiple license
scheme achieved conservation. The net effect of the multiple
license is actually to discourage conservation because it concievably encourages nonresidents to destroy other scarce
resources. Instead of merely hunting elk as under a single
license, the multiple license encourages the hunter to also
harvest bear, deer, and game birds. All of which are scarce
finite resources. Finally, the discriminatorily high multiple
license fails as a conservation measure because the state fails
to similarly regulate its citizens."8 "A statute that leaves a
State's residents' free to destroy a natural resource while excluding aliens or nonresidents is not a conservation law at
all."' 9 Montana had previously achieved its goal of conservation by statutorily limiting the number of licenses issued to
nonresidents. To this end the multiple license becomes
legislative overkill.
Incidental to this general scheme of conservation the
state defended the extreme fee differential on the basis of the
extra cost of enforcement created by the presence of the
nonresident. ° However, the justification on the basis of cost
also fails. At this juncture it is noteworthy to mention that
the appellants never contested the state's right to charge
nonresidents a higher fee. The appellants merely objected to
the grossly disproportionate license fees imposed upon
them.7" In the District Court evidence was offered by an
economist to the effect that no more than 2.5 to 1 ratio could
be justified cost-wise.72 The majority agreed but held that
since the fee differential could not be justified on the basis of
67. Baldwin, supra note 3, at 389.
68. Id. at 1870. (Dissenting opinion).
69. Douglas v. Seacoast Products. Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 285 n. 21 (1977).
70. Baldwin, supra note 3, at 404.
71. Id. at 404. (Dissenting opinion).
72. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish and Game Commission, 417 F.Sup. 1005,
1008 (1976).
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cost they would approach the issue without resorting to the
cost theory. Nevertheless it does appear that a state could
justify a cost differential structure by producing convincing
evidence to support its claims that the nonresident's
presence created extra enforcement problems.
The final argument forwarded by Montana was the
assertion that the state could charge nonresidents, who were
not subject to the state's general taxing power, more than
residents because the residents had contributed to the program making elk hunting possible.73 Incidental to this assertion was the fact that general taxes among other things provided maintenance for state parks and roads allowing access
to the hunting areas.7 4 However, closer scrutiny reveals
flaws in this argument.
To begin with it was noted in Baldwin that 75% of the
elk were killed not on private or state land but on federal
land. 5 Secondly, the nonresident does contribute to wildlife
conservation within the state. The nonresident is obligated
to pay state sales tax on every dollar he spends within the
state the same as residents. Moreover, the nonresident contributes his fair share to Montana's wildlife conservation
through the purchase of hunting licenses. Finally, although
Baldwin upheld the licensing scheme on the basis of rationality, the majority agreed that the State's desire to
engender political support for its program by shifting the
cost of conservation to the powerless nonresident could not
justify an otherwise invidious discrimination.
The final inquiry under the delicate adjustment test involves the consideration of viable alternatives to achieve the
state's ligitimate ends." This inquiry into whether adequate
and less burdensome alternatives exist is important in
discharging the court's task of accommodation of conflicting
local and national interests. 8 In the case of Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison the Court held that even in the exercise of
the city's unquestionable power to protect the public health
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 1008 n. 7.
Baldwin, supra note 3, at 389.
Id. at 377.
Id. at 391 n. 24.
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
A. & P. Tea v. Cottrell, supra note 9 at 373.
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and safety, if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the legitimate local interests are available,
the regulation must fall."9 In other words, to protect the
legitimate state interest from being constitutionally overridden by the commerce clause, the means employed must be
closely tailored to the ends sought.8 0 The court should realize
that there are many less offensive methods of both preserving game and ensuring that the resident has a preferred
claim to the game within the state. To this end it would appear that Montana had previously achieved these goals by
the statutory ceiling on nonresident licenses.
CONCLUSION

The Baldwin court's interpretation has given the states
constitutional protection to charge substantially higher
license fees for nonresidents in recreational activities. There
is no privileges and immunities protection whatsoever and
under equal protection, rationality is sufficient to enable the
legislation to survive. It would not be unreasonable to
assume that many states including Wyoming will follow
Baldwin's prerogative. However, this extreme deference provided under the equal protection clause does not preclude a
commerce clause inquiry. Upon proof that the
discriminatory regulation does in fact affect commerce, the
Supreme Court is obligated to use a balancing of interests
approach. It is clear that under this stricter scrutiny, the
state of Montana would have a much more difficult time
justifying the discriminatory legislation.
BERRY

79.
80.

F.

LAWS III

Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, supra note 82 at 354.
Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish and Game Commission, supra note 77 at
1010: the dissent denied that the means were closely tailored stating, "each such
justification is shown to be either logically and factually unsupportable. Id at 1010,
1011.
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